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Historically, the foreign policy of the United States （US） has oscillated 
between global interaction and isolationism. According to Klingberg （1983）, the 
US, prior to WW II, had gone through cycles of introversion and extroversion 
with each phase lasting approximately 30 years. Since the end of World War 
II, however, the United States has been in a global leadership role. Since then, 
the US presidents have not backed away from the opportunity to highlight its 
responsibility in global affairs. From Harry Truman’s statement, “［The United 
States should］take the lead in running the world in the way that the world 
ought to be run” to Barack Obama’s statement “I am well aware of the 
expectations that accompany my presidency around the world.  These 
expectations are … rooted in hope -- the hope that real change is possible, and 
the hope that America will be a leader in bringing about such change,” all of 
the US presidents have echoed their intention to lead the world. 
Kegley and Wittkopf （1987） argued there are four assumptions that have 
guided American presidents for US involvement in global affairs. The first 
assumption is that the US is the world leader. A position the US accepts. From 
this point, the remaining assumptions follow. The second assumption is that 
the US has global responsibilities and obligations. By becoming a permanent 
member of the United Nations Security Council, clearly the US has global 
responsibilities and obligations. The third assumption is that the US stands for 
freedom. The US has a moral imperative to guard these ideals on the world 
stage. The fourth assumption is that world depends on the US in the name of 
goodness. The US must be ready and willing to act abroad for the good of the 
world. From the end of WWII, the US has been described as a global police 
officer. 
Two principal ideas distributed through international organizations have 
reinforced the United States’ self-conceived notion as the world police officer. 
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The first idea is that peace and security are organized through the United 
Nations and supported by the United States. The second idea is that economic 
prosperity is organized through multiple organizations, such as International 
Monetary Fund or World Trade Organization, which should reflect liberal 
economic ideals. This paper argues that the United States has effectively used 
international institutions to promote liberal principles across the world. The 
first part of the paper reviews the United Nations. The second part reviews 
the international organizations that the US has used to push liberal economic 
development. The final part discusses how the US uses hard power and soft 
power effectively in these organizations.
United Nations
The creat ion of the United Nat ions was to form an internat ional 
organization that would end war, promote peace and justice, and advance 
better living for all mankind. Although one can debate the effectiveness of the 
United Nations, the charter of the United Nations sets forth an inspiring goal 
for all nations. The preamble states the following: 
We the peoples of the United Nations determined
to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in 
our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and
to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of 
the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations 
large and small, and
to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations 
arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be 
maintained, and
to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom,
And for these ends
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to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good 
neighbours, and
to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security, and
to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, 
that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest, and
to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and 
social advancement of all peoples,
Have resolved to combine our efforts to accomplish these aims
Accordingly, our respective Governments, through representatives 
assembled in the city of San Francisco, who have exhibited their full 
powers found to be in good and due form, have agreed to the present 
Charter of the United Nations and do hereby establish an international 
organization to be known as the United Nations （1945）.
By serving as an international forum, members can put forth problems to be 
discussed. The idea of collective security, where all participating states act to 
punish aggressors who violate international law, is good in principal; however, 
it is ineffective in reality. The organization of the United Nations Security 
Council, where permanent members are allowed to veto resolutions effectively, 
limits any form of collective security. This was particularly the case after 
WWII as the adversarial relationship between the United States and the Soviet 
Union （USSR） grew into the Cold War.
There are contending ideas as to why the US and the USSR got locked 
into the Cold War even though they were permanent members of the United 
Nations Security Council. One view argues that the Cold War is just an 
extension of great powers clashing over vital interests. As De Tocqueville 
（1969/1835） had predicted in his famous quote, “There are now two great 
nations in the world which, starting from different points, seem to be 
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advancing toward the same goal: the Russians and the Anglo-Americans…. 
Their point of departure is different and their paths diverse; nevertheless, each 
seems called by some secret desire of Providence one day to hold in its hands 
the destinies of half the world” （p.114）. In this argument, the clash between the 
US and USSR is based on a mutual mistrust of each side seeking greater 
aggrandizement. Their wary perception of each other naturally leads to 
divergent global visions.
Another argument is that the Cold War was a continued extension of the 
US to discredit the USSR. Since the US intervened in the Bolshevik Revolution 
in 1918 and did not extend diplomatic recognition until 1933, the Cold War was 
an extension of two ideologies clashing （Jonsson, 1984）.
A third argument for the Cold War is that the change from President 
Roosevelt to Truman altered American policies that were more hostile in 
expression and intention. Although there were differences among the Allies, 
the leaders of the Allies, Stalin, Churchill, and Roosevelt, had created an 
optimistic post-war plan in which spheres of influence could be maintained 
while not challenging vital national interests. The Tehran Conference followed 
by the Yalta Conference created an atmosphere optimism that the great 
powers could work in harmony. It was only after the death of Roosevelt and 
Truman’s wariness of the Russians that the Cold War began （May, 1984）. 
A fourth argument made is that misperceptions were the biggest factor in 
the Cold War escalating. These misperceptions are the foundation of seeing 
your actions as virtuous and your adversary’s actions as malice. Every action 
increases fear and distrust of another country while desensitizing your own 
actions. George Kennan （1976） noted how the US and the USSR often misread 
each other’s intentions. For example, the Marshall Plan was interpreted by the 
USSR as pre-emptive move to limit their fruits of victory over Germany. The 
USSR’s attempt to make a military base in Korea was evidence of world 
conquest to the Americans （pp. 683-684）.
These arguments are important in understanding how the United Nations 
worked during its formative years. As mentioned previously, the Korean 
peninsula in June of 1950 was the United Nations first opportunity to address 
the independence of Korea with a peaceful solution. Instead, the initial 
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procedures continue to affect political affairs today. As the USSR had 
boycotted the Security Council in early 1950, the decision of the Security 
Council had a decidedly western orientation. The Security Council’s resolution 
to assist South Korea against the northern invasion was short-lived. By August 
1950, the USSR had become the president of the Security Council, through 
regular rotation. Although the Unified Command forces were under the United 
Nation’s flag, they were mainly a composition of western forces with two-thirds 
of them being American （MacQueen, 1999）. As China’s Security Council’s 
permanent seat was held by the Nationalist’s in Taiwan, Mainland China had 
no interest in following the United Nations resolution. As the North Korean 
forces, supported by Chinese volunteers, gained ground in the south, the 
Security Council led by the USSR did nothing. The US response was to 
persuade the Genera l Assembly to pass the “Un i t ing f o r Peace ” 
resolution （377） that transferred security measures from the Security Council 
to the General Assembly when action by the Security Council lack unanimity, 
i.e., one of the members uses its veto power. The Korean War indicated the 
limitations of collective security as conceived in the original charter of the 
United Nations. The United States manipulated the system of the United 
Nations to favor its military and political objectives. 
Although the Korean War highlighted the limitations of collective security, 
it did not prevent the United States from using the United Nations forces for 
political and military objectives. As the Suez Canal crisis in 1956 indicated, the 
US was not averse to dealing with the USSR when it favored their military 
and political objectives, even at the cost of allied national interests of Great 
Britain and France. The US worked in the background to help create the 
United Nations Emergency Force （UNEF）, resolution 1001. Importantly, none 
of the UNEF soldiers were from the Security Council’s permanent members so 
the force did not reflect the Cold War’s adversarial relationship. This “neutral” 
force helped institute the United Nation’s peacekeeping force （MacQueen, 
1999）. This was to become the United Nations model for the Cold War; it 
restrained and contained conflict in areas in which the US and USSR did not 
perceive core national interests at stake. 
MacQueen （1999） also pointed out how the idea of collective security 
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transitioned into peacekeeping in the United Nations based on the Suez Canal 
Crisis, （see Table 1）. He asserted that the crisis had clearly defined objectives 
in which the protagonists on both sides were willing to accept the United 
Nation’s intervention. The area of the crisis, the boundary of the canal, was 
clear, which could effectively limit the scope of methods used. Additionally, all 
the participants were sovereign states that carried the usual obligations of 
such actors.
Table 1. Key Contrasts between Chapter VII Collective Security and Peacekeeping
Collective Security Peacekeeping
Trigger for Action Identification of aggression Identification of a crisis
Contributing forces Chosen and led by permanent 
Security Council members
Middle and small powers
Basis of participation Legal Obligations （Charter article 43） Voluntary
Control Security Council Security Council and 
General assembly
Relationship with protagonists Imposed Consensual （Host consent）
Methods Coercive military action Interposition and 
observation
Objectives Secure pre-determined outcome Create conditions for 
political settlement
He po inted out , however , that the c ircumstances that made the 
peacekeeping forces successful in the Suez Canal were not the same conditions 
for future endeavors. Thus the effectiveness of the peacekeeping forces 
dwindled as the US and USSR used forces to suit their objectives. As one 
example, he used the 1958 crisis in Lebanon. Although the crisis was mainly 
derived from a domestic decision, i.e., President Camille Chamoun seeking to 
re-write the Lebanese constitution, the United Nations passed resolution 128 to 
monitor the Syrian border for illegal infiltration of arms or personnel. When 
the Iraq kingdom was overthrown, the United States provided military support 
to protect the integrity and independence of Lebanon. At that time, the US 
perceived Iraq and Syria as pro-USSR states. In the Lebanese situation, the 
area and objectives of the United Nations forces were susceptible to the 
superpower perceptions in the Cold War.
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Bellamy and Williams （2004, 2010） argued that the result of the Cold War 
led to three characteristics of UN peacekeeping, the ‘Holy Trinity’ of consent, 
impartiality, and restricted force. These concepts are the traditional way of 
conceiving the peacekeeping forces. The concepts reflect a Westphalian logic 
that sovereign states should maintain internal integrity and political 
independence. Western states have been proponents of spreading liberal 
democracies as a way of maintaining peace and prosperity. With the end of the 
Cold War, further arguments have been proposed that aid should reinforce 
democratic ideals and market economics. It is the mantra that democratic 
countries do not attack each other because of shared values. The question 
becomes what is the role of United Nations peacekeeping forces after the Cold 
War. Or cynically, how can the US use the UN more effectivelly? International 
agencies, such as non-governmental organizations （NGOs） or non-profit 
organizations （NPOs） outside of the United Nations sphere highlighted the 
tension between the traditional peacekeeping concept and the post-Cold War 
peacekeeping concept. On the one hand, the peacekeepers should foster peace 
through the principles of non-interference and sovereignty. On the other hand, 
the peacekeepers should foster peace through the creation of l iberal 
democracies. As some western leaders argued, the sovereign state has 
limitations. Tony Blair （1999） argued that state sovereignty should no longer 
be allowed to protect states that abuse the human rights of their citizens. 
Humanity has no borders. Newman, Paris and Richmond （2009） maintain that 
“Contemporary peacebuilding approaches reflect the idea that maintaining 
peace in post-conflict societies requires a multifaceted approach, with attention 
to a wide range of social, economic and institutional needs. They reflect a 
liberal project: not just managing instability between states but seeking to 
build peace within and between states on the basis of liberal democracy and 
market economics” （p. 7）. 
The United Nations’ peacekeeping model reflects the progress of liberal 
institutions spreading the concept of liberalism globally, but still constrained by 
the traditional concept of state sovereignty. The United States has used the 
United Nations to promote its own agenda of liberalism that has led to a 
blurring distinction between enforcement and peacekeeping. In essence, it is 
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reinforcing the idea that sovereign states always reserve the right to make 
decisions based on their national interest. 
International Organizations
Although Tocqueville’s （1969/1835） prediction was based on natural 
resources and territorial size, he also included societal aspects that represented 
the dispute between the US and the USSR. He stated, “To attain their aims, 
the ［America］relies on personal interest and gives free scope to the unguided 
strength and common sense of individuals. ［Russia］in a sense concentrates the 
whole power of society in one man. One has freedom as the principal means of 
action; the other has servitude” （p 114）. Behind all the arguments is a sense 
that the Cold War was about how society should be shaped. On the one hand, 
society should be run like the Soviet version deriving from Marxism where an 
authoritarian political regime imposes state planning, financial equality on mass 
citizenry, and limitations of individual freedom.  On the other hand, society 
should be run with a political regime with limited powers permitting private 
ownership that accepts the tradeoff of economic inequality for individual 
liberty. 
The end of WW II allowed the US an opportunity to shape global markets 
for several reasons. One reason was that the war had destroyed the industrial 
economies in most countries; and the USSR and China opted not to join a 
market -or ientated economy. Another reason was that the US had 
approximately two-thirds of the world’s gold, which allowed its financial 
philosophy to dictate terms in the creation of new international financial bodies. 
The Bretton Woods agreement created three pillars of support for the 
American view of the post-war financial development: The International 
Monetary Fund （IMF）, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade （GATT）, 
and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development （World Bank）. 
These institutions are not neutral. As Barnett and Finnemore （2004） pointed 
out, international organizations promote a specific worldview. They develop 
into complex bureaucracies with special power, authority, and legitimacy to set 
agendas and influence developments in the international system. Most 
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international organizations were founded by Western liberal states and are 
designed to promote liberal values. 
The financial institutions acted as regulators of US plans. The IMF focused 
on providing monetary stability where states could receive loans to pay off 
debts in a timely manner. The World Bank focused on providing investment 
for infrastructure so that economies could rebuild and grow. GATT provided a 
liberal trade orientation of reduced trade barriers and reduced trading 
preferences. The three pillars of the postwar economic system enabled stable 
exchange rates that would encourage foreign trade and elevate the dollar to 
the status of international currency.
There were several world events that allowed the US to manipulate these 
organizations favorably. The first event was that the institutions of the IMF 
and World Bank were woefully underfunded to help Europe recover. By early 
1947, most of Europe had not recovered from pre-war economic levels （Spero, 
1990）.  Great Britain’s attempts to convert the pound into gold, as prescribed 
in the Bretton Woods agreement, were a failure. The IMF was not able to 
issue loans great enough for Great Britain to cover its debts. Great Britain 
suspended conversion immediately and did not allow convertibly of the pound 
again until 1958. The US initiated the Marshall Plan as a means to circumvent 
the Bretton Woods agreement by allowing reverse discrimination against the 
dollar （McKinlay & Little, 1986）. The second challenge was the threat of 
communism from the USSR. For the US to manage the monetary system, it 
needed to run a payment deficit; US dollars had to flow outside the US to 
become the world’s currency. The Marshall Plan, in addition to other aid 
programs, as well as military expenditures to NATO and the Korean War, 
allowed the US the opportunity to make the dollar the world’s currency.  By 
spending dollars outside the US, allies accepted security in exchange dollar 
liquidity （Spero, 1990）.
The end of the Bretton Woods agreement was a US response to its 
overflow of dollars into the international monetary system. In 1960, foreign 
dollar holdings exceeded US gold reserves for the first time. Europe and Japan 
had recovered economically. By 1971, central banks from leading industrial 
countries were no longer able to control large currency flows that affected the 
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fixed exchange rate. President Nixon on August 15, 1971, announced the US 
would no longer convert dollars into gold. Although one might assume the 
dollar losing its role as the world’s currency for this action, it did not. The main 
reason is that other countries, such as Japan and Germany, have been reluctant 
to give up control over their domestic economies by allowing the their 
currency to play a central international role （Spero, 1990）. 
GATT followed a similar pattern to that of the Bretton Woods agreement 
in that greater trading interdependence led to changes. It differed from the 
Bretton Woods agreement in that GATT did not s tart as an o f f ic ia l 
organization, rather it was a consensus between trading partners that 
implemented free trade . Cruc ia l to free trade was the pr inc ip le o f 
nondiscrimination which implied that “any advantage, favour, privilege or 
immunity granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or 
dest ined for any other country sha l l be accorded immediate ly and 
unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the territories 
of all other contracting parties” （GATT, 1994）. Basically, tariffs among 
members of the treaty would be the same. It also established international 
commercial codes against dumping, subsidies, or quantitative restrictions such 
as quotas. By 1995, however, GATT transitioned itself into an official 
organization called the World Trade Organization.  
All three organizations, IMF, World Bank, and WTO, have been heavily 
criticized over the years and modified their missions accordingly. The IMF 
changed from overseeing a system of fixed exchange rates to overseeing 
developing countries macroeconomics. It ’s main mantra of economic 
liberalization, however, did not change. The World Bank changed from 
reconstructing Europe to developing the countries from the post-colonial 
period. Many of its policies complemented that of the IMF, but the focus now 
is more on technocratic knowledge of good banking techniques. As GATT 
transitioned into the WTO, it expanded its mission from tarriff related 
agreements to services rendered and intellectual property agreements. These 
changes reflect the nature of expanding trade, especially in developed 
economies （Higgott, 2012）.
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America’s Hard and Soft Power
As argued previous ly , the United States has used internat ional 
organizations to spread the liberal philosophy thoughout the world. It has 
taken on the self-perceived notion of the world’s police officer. The US enjoys 
two levels of policy-making. The first level is directly through the state 
appratus, which like all states do. The second level is through international 
organization such as the IMF and WTO. International organizations usually 
conduct the decision-making process through sovereign states. When states 
are considered equal and without any negating status applied to them, they 
should be able to decide national interests quite easily and clearly. The 
question becomes, why would powerful states join international organizations 
that negate their power by treating all states equal? Steinberg （2002） examined 
this very question. He concluded that “When GATT/WTO bargaining is law-
based, states take procedural rules seriously, attempting to build a consensus 
that is Pareto-improving, yielding market-opening contracts that are roughly 
symmetrical. When GATT/WTO bargaining is power-based, states bring to 
bear instruments of power that are extrinsic to rules （instruments based 
primarily on market size）, invisibly weighting the decision-making process and 
generat ing outcomes that are asymmetrical and may not be Pareto-
improving” （341）. He goes on to state that although the procedural rules are 
consensual, it is based on an invisible weighting system that favors the 
powerful states. In essence, the rules are rigged in favor of the United States 
and its liberal-orientated trading system. 
Reinforcing the idea that the US uses its soft and hard power to influence 
the world market, Catley and Mosler （2007） argued that after establishing 
commodity markets, the US used the Cold War as a means of protecting those 
markets through trade. The US has vast amounts of resources, but as 
mentioned previously, the US needed to rebuild the world economy after 
WWII. Therefore, the US invested money abroad that created these resource 
commodity markets such as oil. The US expanded its foreign policy to ensure 
the availability of these resources and markets. In addition, the US has the top 
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two world’s stock exchanges in market capitalization: New York Stock 
Exchange and NASDAQ （Kiersz, 2014）. From the capital investment in the 
two leading exchanges, it is also argued that the US remains the primary 
location for technological innovation in the world economy. Combine the 
advanced markets with technological advances and the main source of hard 
power, the military, the US is the unquestioned world leader. The US spends 
more on its defense than any other nation. Over the last 30 years, its military 
expenditure is approximately 35-40% of the global total （Walker, 2014）.
American soft power can be categorized in two ways: low and high 
culture. ‘Low culture’ is often characterized as fast food or Hollywood movies, 
and these types of culture are genrally not politically influential. ‘High culture’ 
on the other hand can be influential because it usually relates to education. 
Most of the world’s top univesities are located in the US. Over half a million 
students came to study in the US in 2012, up form 100,000 in 2001. After 
graduating, many students go back to their home country with favorable 
views of the US （Ruiz, 2014）. Although these students do not necessarily agree 
with US foreign policies, their experience in the US can expose them to 
viewpoints beyond local media. According the Pew Research Center （2014）, 
America’s image in the world is quite strong, especially among young people, 
as indicated in Figure 1. Over 60% of Africa, Europe, Asia, and Laten America 
have a positive image of the US. Only in the Middle East is the image of the 
Figure 1. America’s image in the world in 2014.
Generally Favorable Views of the U.S.,
Except in Middle East
*Global median of 43 countries not including U.S.
Note: Russia and Ukraine not included in Europe median.
Source: Spring 2014 Global Attirudes survey. Q15a.
PEW RESEARCH CENTER
Global median*
Africa
Europe
Asia
Latin America
Middle East
Median favorable views of U.S., by region
65%
74
66
66
65
30
（178）13
US under 60% and that image is ever-changing depending on the country, 
except Isreal. Over the last ten years, the image of the US in China has been 
improving, reaching 50% in 2014.
Interestingly, the views of American college graduates did not differ much 
from their European col lege counteparts when asked about foreign 
engagement. College graduates tended to favor international engagement over 
isolationism as compared to those that had not attended college. American 
graduates differed from their European counterparts when asked whether 
United Nations approval is necessary to use military force in international 
conflicts. The Americans were evenly divided  （44%─45%） in seeking UN 
approval, whereas the European graduates overwhelming （20%─70%） thought 
UN approval was necessary prior to using military force Pew Research 
Center （2012）. 
America’s use of soft and hard power indicates that national interests play 
a strategic role in setting foreign policy. Although the US favors a liberal 
philiosohical orientation, it will not be constained by it when claimed national 
interest is at stake. Politically, the US ssupports all types of regimes, even 
undemoctatic ones such as Saudi Arabi when it favors the US to do so. 
Economically, the government encourages US corporations to expand abroad; 
hence, the common phrase of “Washington Consensus” being mis-applied to 
mean US corporations dictating foreign policy to the government. 
The United States has used two principal ideas to shape foreign affairs. 
The first idea is that peace and security are organized through the United 
Nations. The second idea is that liberal ideals organized through international 
organizations increase economic prosperity for the world. This paper argued 
that the United States has effectively used international institutions to promote 
liberal principles across the world even though at times the process it used 
were not l iberal orientated. The US uses both hard and soft power to 
effectively run and manintain these organizations that benefit not only its 
national interest, but also the world’s.
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